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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Professor Cramer has developed an interesting and insightful analysis – the focus on 
who’s actually talking is a very useful addition to general studies on the nature and 
practice of arguing with others. The present paper is an outgrowth of an earlier analysis 
(which Prof. Cramer shared with me); this commentary will reflect awareness of both 
studies.  
 I will focus on three issues in this commentary. First, I want to reflect a bit on the 
broader context of “controversy,” particularly as that has been treated by Goodnight 
(1991), Olson and Goodnight (1994) and more recently by Phillips (1999). Second, I 
wish to extend the concept of “reason” a bit further than is suggested by Cramer’s 
analysis. Finally, I will focus attention on another “side” of the controversy that Cramer 
examines. My intent in this latter focus is to further extend, rather than critique, the work 
Cramer has so expertly begun.  
 
2. THE STATUS OF CONTROVERSY 
 
Phillips study provides a point of departure, as he reviews prior work on the nature of 
controversy. He is correct, I think, in remarking on the limitation in conceiving of 
controversy as deficient or, in a Habermasian sense, a “distortion” that disrupts and 
confounds attempts to reason well and fairly within the public sphere. Seeing controversy 
as an obstacle to an otherwise purely rational discursive encounter with social others is, I 
believe, exactly the wrong way to orient ourselves to the presence of conflictive views. 
An approach that privileges dissensus as the “starting point” for understanding the nature 
of controversy provides the kind of antidote that Phillips argues for in disconnecting 
controversy from the norms of a modernist public sphere. As I’ve argued (McKerrow, 
2006), “it is not simply or only an instance of ‘either dissensus or consensus’ but not both 
together. The starting point remains with dissensus . . . . Argument is, ever and always, 
conflictive.” As such, it is or can be highly ratiocinative and passionate at one and the 
same time—there is in this approach no room for the disjunction between reason and 
emotion, as if the latter were somehow inopportune or simply inappropriate in the 
conduct of an argument with another. Argument is, as should be clear, the giving of 
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reasons in support or a particular claim or position. That it implies oppositionality – in the 
form of different ways to reach the same claim, or different claims being advanced – does 
not mean it is therefore somehow deficient in allowing the public to deliberate in a 
meaningful manner on issues that are, in themselves, considered divisive. Thus, I would 
not see the conclusion Cramer arrives at, per Dascal (1990), as necessarily a negative 
condition – that controversy “slips” out of dialectical boundaries is to suggest that it 
belongs elsewhere. Dialectic admits of purely ratiocinative discourse, as per Habermas 
and others who write on behalf of reason in fostering a deliberative democracy 
(McKerrow, 2006). Controversy is aligned with everyday discourse—and the very nature 
of that discourse is that it may be undisciplined, even at times uncivil, and essentially and 
perhaps always “messy.” To say that they “feature little of the reasoning that is central to 
a dialectical exchange” is not to say that controversy is therefore un-reasoned. Its 
commitment to reasoning remains central to the acceptance or rejection of points of view, 
but admits of more than pure ratiocination in arriving at judgments related to the 
justification behind belief or action (McKerrow, 1990).  
   
3. THE NATURE OF REASON 
 
In the initial study, Cramer (2006) asks “who counts as a participant” in the Brooklyn Art 
Museum controversy, as determined by who is cited/quoted in relation to the issues by 
the print media. Cramer reports that Rudy Giuliani, then Mayor of NYC, and Arnold 
Lehman, the museum’s director, were the most cited. Although his focus is on print 
sources, I would venture a guess that, were televised transcripts reviewed during the 
controversy, he would find a similar pattern emerging – at the very least, it would be an 
interesting comparative study, in determining whether the channel – print or television, 
differed substantially in giving voice to specific participants (and thereby denying voice 
to others). I’m reminded here of a recent university issue which occasioned a major 
public presentation by the president, only to be followed in the evening’s regional 
televised report featuring a principal antagonist claiming nothing of import was said. The 
appearance of a “controversy” was explicit, without giving the President’s supporter’s 
equal voice or space to comment. Point-counterpoint between, in the case Cramer 
examines, between the person responsible for the city’s morals (at least that is one way to 
describe Giuliani’s justification for objecting) and the person most responsible for 
protecting the museum’s investment in featuring specific works of art, is “par for the 
course” on the media’s part. Or at least so it would seem.  
 Cramer uses categories of speech acts in identifying the quotations from Giuliani; 
he observes that while “Giuliani is quoted 271 times in the corpus . . . reasoning is rare in 
Giuliani’s direct reported speech.”  I understand the sense of reason that is implied here, 
but would prefer a slightly amended phrase – “explicit, detailed reasoning.”  The point I 
want to make is this: reason is present in evaluative, undetailed “assertive” expressions 
by Giuliani, such as: “It’s sick stuff.” “[The exhibit is an] abominable use of funds.”  “It 
[the exhibit] offends me.”  The same could be said for “expressive” claims, such as “This 
board is out of business.”  These statements are conclusionary – they are the result of a 
ratiocinative (and quite likely, emotionally tinged) process of reasoning. That the 
reasoning is implicit, given the enthymematic character of public argument, does not 
lessen its relevance in examining the nature of Giuliani’s objection to the exhibit. For 
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example, to claim that something is “sick” requires a sense of its opposite – that which 
when viewed would not elicit the same rejection as implied in the “sick” judgment: 
“artistic expression which violates the moral sense is sick”; this art violates the moral 
sense”; ergo, “this art is sick.” What should be clear here is that the exact nature of the 
reasoning that might be reconstructed is not the point – there are several different ways of 
arriving at a reasoned judgment that a particular piece of art is “not art,” as is 
demonstrated by Cramer’s analysis of a more explicit, detailed statement from Giuliani. 
For media purposes, especially in the context of capturing “sound bites,” with assertive 
claims as to art’s lack of decency, hence absence of value, the less detailed, explicit the 
reasoning the better. This is not to discredit Cramer’s analysis, but merely to suggest a 
more precise phrasing in order to retain the broader, more encompassing sense of 
reason—as implied and enthymematic as well as explicitly detailed in serial form.  
That the assertion is “unsupported,” as Cramer rightly observes, does not diminish 
its status as the conclusion of a piece of reasoning. Giuliani could just as easily be relying 
on his status as Mayor – and implicitly as the conscience of the city – to offer judgments 
that would be expected by one who has that responsibility. Referring to supportive data or 
evidence would not even be thought of as necessary – the moral force of the Mayor’s 
statement should carry the day. And with some citizens and groups, such as the Catholic 
League, that was certainly the case.  
  
4. AN ANALYSIS 
The first part of this extension examines the legal side of the dispute. In an opinion 
released by the U. S. District Court’s Eastern District (Opinion and Order: 99 CV 6071) 
the court reviewed the history of the Museum’s establishment, including its contract with 
the city. In clear terms, the court indicated that the contract did not permit the City to 
have the kind of jurisdiction over its contents as dictated by Giuliani’s suit 
(http://www.museum-security.org/brooklyn%20november%201999.htm):  
The Contract provides that: 
The Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences . . . shall place on exhibition in said Museum Building 
collections of paintings and other works of art and collections and books representing or 
illustrating each and all of the Departments of the arts and sciences named in the constitution of 
said Institute, and shall cause to be properly arranged, labelled [sic] and catalogued all such 
collections and books as may be open to public exhibition or for public use, for the instruction and 
benefit of the residents of Brooklyn or the general public. 
The Contract is unequivocal that the City has no ownership rights with respect to any of the 
collections in the Museum. It provides: 
That the collections of books and other objects in art and sciences placed in the Museum Building 
for purposes of exhibition, instruction, or to enable the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences to 
carry out its purposes as authorized in its charter, shall continue to be and shall remain absolutely 
the property of the [Institute], and that neither the [Mayor nor the City of Brooklyn] by reason of 
said property being placed in said building or continuance therein, have any title, property or 
interest therein. 
3 
RAYMIE E. MCKERROW 
From here, the court proceeds to provide explicit reasoning in denying the city’s claims, 
and in supporting the museum’s counter claims of infringement of first amendment 
rights. What is clear in the court’s analysis of the issue is that the Mayor’s moral claims 
have no legal standing in prohibiting the museum from exhibiting art that, in this case, the 
Mayor finds offensive. Cutting funding, and seeking to eject the museum from its site, as 
punishment for the refusal to cancel the exhibit, were strategies that fell on deaf ears (at 
least legally speaking). The legal case, however, does not silence the moral argument—as 
that existed outside the courtroom’s influence. It is interesting, in the context of Cramer’s 
analysis of who is given the right to speak publicly (via the press) on this issue, to review 
the list of individuals and groups who submitted briefs amicus curiae to the court. What, 
one might ask, is the relationship between this list (on both plaintiff and defendant’s 
sides) and those cited for and against the controversy in the press? What is the 
infrastructure like in responding on either side to this case – from government and from 
agencies/organizations affected by the exhibit? Who has power in this setting to obtain 
the “ear” of the press, such that their views become dominant in the public’s eye? One 
major group which argued on behalf of the Mayor’s position was the Catholic League 
(1999) . As reported on their website, with some pride:  
On October 2, Catholic League personnel will distribute vomit bags to the first 500 attendees of 
the ‘Sensation’ exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum of Art; we will commence our protest at 11:00 
a.m. The distribution of vomit bags—all of which are labeled ‘Vomit Bag: Compliments of the 
Catholic League’—is in direct response to the exhibit’s warning that seeing it may induce 
vomiting. On this score the Catholic League readily agrees, and that explains our desire to 
facilitate the process. Barf is not easily cleaned up, and it also has a terrible odor, so it should be 
deposited in a biodegradable receptacle.. . . Now that art has been reduced to dung and puke, there 
is no better time for public officials to stop all funding of the arts.  
And, from the same source:  
The Brooklyn Museum of Art has offended Catholics by rationalizing its decision to host 
‘Sensation,’ an exhibit that features a painting of the Virgin Mary laced with elephant dung and 
surrounded by pictures of vaginas and anuses. Along with the dismembered animals that the 
exhibit displays, the only term that can be used to describe this monstrosity is ‘snuff art.’ . . . 
Catholics salute Mayor Giuliani for his courage and decency in opposing funding of the Brooklyn 
Museum of Art for its obstinacy on this issue.  
While more was said by the League’s President, William Donahue, on their behalf, the 
above gives an inkling of the position taken by those the Mayor implied would find the 
artistic creations offensive. Their argument is that no money from government should 
fund art—if this is the kind of response that artists provide. The argument, of course, is an 
old one. Social realism art provoked similar reactions during the depression, at a time 
when art was supported by government, and artists were “controlled” on occasion in 
being forced to alter their work to meet politically charged decency standards 
(McKerrow, 1993). What is intriguing in this response by the Catholic League, as well as 
in the discourse (to my knowledge) surrounding the affair, is that the artist’s own status 
as a Catholic is not mentioned. As Katha Pollitt (2001) noted a year or so later, in 
reviewing yet another objection by Giuliani to a painting at the Brooklyn Museum: “If 
one thinks of Catholics, the people, there's nothing bigoted about any of this. (Like Ofili, 
Cox is Catholic--as are most perpetrators of "anti-Catholic" works.)” Whether it is the 
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case, as Pollitt suggests, that anti-Catholic work is perpetrated by Catholics, I find it 
interesting that this issue is not raised as part of the objection. What is the special status 
that the artist has, as Catholic, that would render that fact about his association with the 
Church a silent issue?  Neither the Catholic League, nor Giuliani, nor the Press, as near as 
I can tell, raised the issue of the artist’s own religion. Nor did the Catholic League seek to 
refute claims that elephant dung, in African culture, has a status that marks it as non-
objectionable, and in fact its use by Ofili (also of Nigerian origin though born in England) 
would have any bearing on the interpretation offered.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In drawing this review to a close, it might be useful, in considering both Cramer’s study 
and this commentary, to see the painting that was at the center of the controversy:  
 
 
Chris Ofili: The Virgin Mary 
“Ofili's work is made up of paper collage, oil paint, glitter, polyester resin and elephant 
dung on linen.”  
 
 Whether you find the work anti-catholic, as did Giuliani and the Catholic League, 
or a piece of art, the argument over what justifies public support of the arts remains an 
unresolved issue. What Cramer has provided through his 2006 and current analyses is a 
clear sense of “who counts” in public controversies. The power structure is a clear player 
in the media’s assessment of whose importance merits public voice. What is surprising, 
as Cramer notes, is the extent to which the print media actually gives full voice to public 
reasoning over controversial topics. 
 
link to paper
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